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and Formal Semantics
Abstract. This paper provides a comparative analysis of the issue of natural 
logic: the “formalizational approach”, prevalent in contemporary logic, and 
the “regimentational approach”, prevalent in medieval logic, as exemplified 
by the 14th-century nominalist philosopher, John Buridan. The differences 
between the two are not as great as they may first appear: a little tweaking 
of standard quantification theory can take us surprisingly close to Buridan’s 
logic. However, as the conclusion of the paper points out, there still are some 
fundamental differences between the resulting “reconstructed Buridanian 
logic” and Buridan’s logic itself, discussed in detail in the author’s recent 
monograph.
NATURAL LANGUAGE AND THE IDEA 
OF A “FORMAL SYNTAX” IN BURIDAN
The idea of the universality of logic is based on the conviction that despite the 
immense diversity of human languages, there are certain invariant features of 
human reasoning, carried out in any natural language whatsoever, that allow the 
formulation of universal logical laws, applicable to any language. It is precisely for 
expressing these universal, invariant aspects of human reasoning that in modern 
logic we construct an artificial language, which is then conceived to serve as a 
more direct linguistic expression of those invariant conceptual structures that 
are variously expressed by various natural languages. 
But this is not the only possible way to achieve the desired transparency 
of conceptual structure through the transparency of syntax. The way the 14th-
century nominalist philosopher, John Buridan (and medieval logicians in general) 
achieved this was by using, not a full-fledged artificial language, but an artificially 
“regimented” Latin. We can get a nice, yet relatively simple illustration of what 
this “regimentation” of Latin consists in if we take a closer look at how Buridan 
introduces the idea that every simple categorical proposition of Latin can be 
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reduced to the “canonical” subject-copula-predicate form. After briefly stating 
the division of propositions into categorical and hypothetical, and the description 
of categorical propositions as those that consist of subject and predicate as their 
principal parts, Buridan remarks:
… a verb has to be analyzed into the verb ‘is’ as third adjacent , provided that 
the proposition is assertoric [de inesse ] and in the present tense [de praesenti ], 
and into the participle of that verb, as for example, ‘A man runs’ is to be 
analyzed into ‘A man is running’, and similarly, ‘A man is’ into ‘A man is a 
being’.1
English speakers might at once notice that the proposed transformation does 
not always yield equivalent sentences, given the tendency in English to use 
the simple present tense to signify habitual action as opposed to the continuous 
present tense, consisting of the copula and the appropriate participle, which is 
used to express present action. For instance, if I say ‘I smoke’, I may simply 
want to express that I am a smoker, a person who has the habit of smoking, 
but this does not mean that I am actually smoking, which would properly be 
expressed by the sentence ‘I am smoking’. In fact, in accordance with Buridan’s 
theory of predication, according to which the affirmative copula expresses the 
identity of the supposita, that is, the referents of the terms flanking it, a more 
appropriate rendering of his proposed transformation would be ‘I am [identical 
with] someone smoking’. 
But Buridan might answer that this is merely a difference in the different 
syntactical “clues” a different language uses to indicate a different sort of 
underlying conceptual construction. The simple present tense of English, when 
it is used to signify habitual action, should then not be analyzed into a participle 
and a simple assertoric copula, but perhaps (somewhat unidiomatically) into a 
participle and an adverbially modified copula, as in ‘I am usually smoking’,2 
where we just express in the surface syntax of this sentence an adverbial modifier 
that is unmarked in the simple tense (as is the implicit copula), but which is 
nevertheless present in the corresponding mental proposition. In any case, it is 
in this spirit that Buridan answers four questions he raises in connection with 
the issue of the “canonical form” of categorical propositions:
1  SD 1.3.2.
2  Alternatively, one might say that the best explication of ‘I smoke’ expressing the habit is 
‘I am a smoker’, where the nominal definition of ‘smoker’ may explicate the habit, as in ‘x is 
a smoker iff x has the habit of smoking’. But as Buridan often remarks, “examples are not to 
be verified”, i.e., it does not matter whether we provide “the right analysis” here, as long as 
it serves to illustrate the point.
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But then some questions arise. The first concerns what such a copula 
signifies. The second is whether that copula is a principal part of a categorical 
proposition. The third question is whether the proposition ‘The one lecturing 
and disputing is a master or a bachelor’ is categorical or hypothetical; for it 
seems that it is hypothetical, since it has two subjects and two predicates. 
The fourth question is the same concerning the proposition ‘A man who 
is white is colored’; for it seems that it is hypothetical, since here we have 
two subjects, two predicates and two copulas; and also because it seems 
to be equivalent to ‘A man is colored, who is white’ which is apparently 
hypothetical.3
In his reply, Buridan provides the rationale for the canonical subject-copula-
predicate structure in terms of what modern linguists would certainly recognize 
as “deep structure”, and what for Buridan is the conceptual structure of the 
corresponding mental proposition: 
To the first question we should reply that a spoken proposition has to 
signify a mental proposition [..]. A mental proposition, however, involves a 
combination of concepts [complexio conceptuum], and so it presupposes in the 
mind some simple concepts, to which it adds a complexive concept, by means 
of which the intellect affirms or denies one of those [presupposed simple] 
concepts of the other. Thus, those presupposed concepts are the subject 
and the predicate in a mental proposition, and they are called the matter of 
the mental proposition, for they are presupposed by the common form of 
a proposition, just as matter is presupposed by the substantial form in [the 
process of] generation. And then it is clear that the subject and the predicate 
of the spoken proposition signify in the mind the subject and the predicate 
of the mental proposition. The copula ‘is’ signifies an affirmative complexive 
concept , whereas the copula ‘is not’ signifies a negative complexive concept; 
and the intellect is unable to form that complexive concept except when it 
has formed those which are the subject and the predicate, for it is impossible 
to have the combination [complexio ] of the predicate with the subject without 
the predicate and the subject. And this is what Aristotle meant4 when he said 
that ‘is’ signifies a certain composition which cannot be understood without 
the components.5 
What fundamentally justifies sticking to the idea of this “canonical form” 
according to Buridan is that no matter how a mental proposition is expressed 
3  SD 1.3.2.
4  Aristotle , On Interpretation, 1, 16b24.
5  SD 1.3.2.
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in the (“surface”) syntax of a spoken language, the concept of the copula is 
there in the mental proposition. Therefore, indicating it in the syntax of the 
spoken proposition merely explicates the presence of the complexive concept 
of the copula in the corresponding mental proposition. Indeed, this explication 
is always justified because, as Buridan now explains in his answer to the second 
question, that complexive concept has to be present in any mental proposition: 
To the second question we should reply that the copula is truly a principal 
part of the proposition, because there could not be a categorical proposition 
without it; and also because it can be compared to a form of the subject and 
the predicate, and the form is a principal part of a composite.6
Thus, given that the copula is the “formal”, principal part of a categorical 
proposition, i.e., it is that complexive concept (proposition-forming functor) in 
the mind without which the concepts corresponding to the terms would not 
constitute a proposition, it is obvious that no matter how complex those terms 
and the corresponding concepts are, if they are joined by one copula, then they 
form one proposition. This is precisely the basis of Buridan’s answer to the third 
question:
To the third question we should reply that that proposition is categorical; 
for it does not contain two categoricals, as there is only one copula here; 
neither are there several subjects, nor several predicates here, for the whole 
phrase ‘the one lecturing and disputing’ is a single subject […], namely, a 
conjunctive subject, and the whole phrase ‘master or bachelor’ is likewise a 
single predicate, although disjunctive.7
As this remark clearly illustrates, Buridan would allow complex terms in 
either the subject or the predicate positions of otherwise simple, categorical 
propositions. In fact, given the potentially unlimited complexity of the terms of 
categorical propositions, these propositions may exhibit a very complex structure 
within their terms, despite the simplicity of the general subject-copula-predicate 
scheme. For it is not just the (iterable) “Boolean” operations of disjunction, 
conjunction and negation that can yield potentially infinite complexity in these 
terms, but also the fact that any proposition can be turned into a term (by forming 
a “that-clause”) or into a determination of a determinable term (in the form of 
a relative clause). For example, if we take the proposition ‘A man is running’, it 
can easily be transformed into the term ‘That a man is running’, which can then 
6  SD 1.3.2.
7  Ibid. Note that in Buridan’s usage, ‘hypothetical’ in this context simply means ‘complex’, 
as opposed to the widespread modern usage that makes it equivalent to ‘conditional’.
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be the subject of another proposition, e.g., ‘That a man is running is possible’ or 
a part of another more complex term in another proposition, as in ‘That a man is 
running is believed by Socrates’. Again, taking the proposition ‘A man is white’, 
and inserting a relative pronoun after its subject, we get another complex term 
‘A man who is white’, which can then be the subject in the proposition ‘A man 
who is white is colored’. 
Now if we look at this proposition in this way, namely, as having a complex 
subject term built up from a head noun as the determinable determined by a 
relative clause, then it should be obvious why Buridan gives the following 
answer to the problem raised in connection with this proposition:
To the fourth question we should reply that there is one predicate here, 
namely, ‘colored’, which by the mediation of the copula is predicated of the 
whole of the rest as of its subject, namely, of the whole phrase: ‘man who 
is white’; for the whole phrase: ‘who is white’ functions as a determination 
of the subject ‘man’. And the case is not similar to ‘A man is colored, who 
is white’, for there are two separate predicates here, which are predicated 
separately of their two subjects, and there is not a predicate here which 
would be predicated by the mediation of one copula of the whole of the rest. 
And although these [propositions] are equivalent, they are not equivalent 
if we add a universal sign. For positing the case that every white man runs 
and there are many others who do not run, the proposition ‘Every man who 
is white runs’ is true, and is equivalent to: ‘Every white man runs’; but the 
proposition ‘Every man, who is white, runs’ is false, for it is equivalent to: 
‘Every man runs and he is white’.8
Buridan’s response to the objection in terms of distinguishing two 
interpretations of the relative clause indicated by different word order is 
particularly revealing of his practice of using a “regimented Latin” to make 
logical distinctions. Indeed, the difference between the syntactical devices 
used in English and Latin to make the same distinction is also very instructive 
concerning the advantages and disadvantages of developing logical theory in a 
“regimented” natural language, as opposed to doing the same using an artificial 
language, as we usually do nowadays. 
Let us take a closer look at the syntax and the semantics of the propositions 
distinguished here, both in English and in Latin: 
Homo qui est albus est coloratus(1) 
A man who is white is colored(2) 
Homo est coloratus qui est albus(3) 
A man, who is white, is colored (4) 
8  SD 1.3.2.
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Omnis homo qui est albus currit (5) ↔ (5’) Omnis homo albus currit
Every man who is white runs (6) ↔ (6’) Every white man runs
Omnis homo currit qui est albus (7) ↔ (7’) Omnis homo currit et ille est 
albus
Every man, who is white, runs (8) ↔ (8’) Every man runs, and he is white
Every other line here is the English translation of the Latin of the preceding 
line. Yet, the syntactical devices by which the Latin and the English sentences 
bring out the intended conceptual distinction are obviously different (word 
order vs. punctuation). Nevertheless, the important thing from our present point 
of view is that these different devices can (and do) bring out the same conceptual 
distinction. 
As should be clear, the fundamental difference in all the contrasted cases 
is whether the relative clause is construed as a restrictive relative clause, forming 
part of the complex subject term, or it is construed as a non-restrictive relative 
clause, making a separate claim referring back to the simple subject of the main 
clause. 
The “regimentation” of the syntax of a natural language, therefore, is the 
explication, and occasionally even the stipulation, of which syntactical structures of 
the given language are supposed to convey which conceptual constructions. The 
governing principle of Buridan’s regimentation of his technical Latin seems to 
be what may be called the principle of scope-based ordering. This principle is most 
clearly at work in the “Polish notation” in modern formal logic (where the order 
of application of logical connectives is indicated by their left-to-right ordering), 
but something similar is quite clearly noticeable in Buridan’s rules of logical 
syntax in general.
To be sure, Buridan never goes as far as to organize Latin according to the 
rules of a formal syntax in the way a modern artificial language is constructed.9 
And for all his views about the conventionality of language, even he would shy 
away from re-rewriting the rules of Latin grammar to fit the requirements of the 
syntax of an artificial language. Rather, he uses the existing grammatical, structural 
features of Latin (sometimes stretching, and sometimes bending them a little) 
to make conceptual distinctions. However, once such a distinction is somehow 
made, using some such existing syntactical device, Buridan’s regimentation of 
Latin consists in his insistence on the point that this syntactical device should 
be consistently regarded as expressing this conceptual distinction, at least when 
we use language for the purposes of logic (as opposed to, for example, using it 
to do poetry).
9  I tried to do this once for a tiny fragment of Latin with an explicitly listed finite vocabu-
lary for the purposes of illustration, and even that resulted in an extremely complex, unwieldy 
system. See (Klima 1991). 
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REGIMENTATION VS. FORMALIZATION
Thus, even if doing logic by means of a full-fledged artificial, formal language 
did not even emerge as a theoretical alternative for Buridan, given the fact that 
in our time this is the dominant approach to logic, we should pause here a little 
to reflect on the theoretical as well as the practical advantages and disadvantages 
of these two different approaches. 
One apparent disadvantage of Buridan’s “regimentational” approach in 
comparison to the modern “formalizational” approach is that an informal system 
can never be as exact as a formal one, given all the possible ambiguities and 
arbitrariness of an informal approach. By contrast, in the formal approach, the 
rules of interpretation in a formal semantics and the manipulations with formulae 
in a formal syntax are fixed by the highest standards of mathematical exactitude, 
which can never be matched by any sort of informal approach. Therefore, it 
seems that Buridan’s approach suffers from an inherent inexactitude that can be 
overcome only by the formalizational approach.
Again, Buridan’s approach renders the construction of logical theory in a 
fundamental sense unfinishable. Given the immense variety and variability of the 
syntactical forms of a natural language, a logical theory based on its regimentation 
will never cover all syntactically possible constructions in a natural language. 
By contrast, since in an artificial language we have an explicit and effective set 
of construction rules, we can formulate logical laws that apply to all possible 
well-formed formulae of that language without having to worry about possible 
formulae that may not be covered by these laws.
Furthermore, Buridan’s approach seems to be plagued by what may be termed 
its linguistic provincialism. If logical rules and distinctions are formulated in terms 
of the regimentation of the existing syntactical devices of a particular natural 
language, then, given the obvious syntactical diversity of natural languages, this 
approach seems to threaten the universality of logical theory. Indeed, following 
the lead of the syntax of a particular natural language may even provide “false 
clues” concerning what we may mistakenly believe to be the universal conceptual 
structure of Mentalese. By contrast, the formalizational approach provides equal 
access for speakers of all languages to the same “conceptual notation”, which 
directly reflects the structure of the common mental language of all human 
beings endorsed by Buridan. So, apparently, even Buridan’s logic would be 
much better off if it were also couched in an artificial, formal language.
Finally, if we use the natural language embodying our logic in our reflections 
on the same natural language, then we are obviously running the risk of Liar-
type paradoxes, which are bound to emerge under the resulting conditions 
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of semantic closure, first diagnosed as such by Alfred Tarski.10 By contrast, an 
artificial language embodying our logical theory can serve as the object language of 
the considerations concerning the syntax and semantics of this language which 
are to be carried out in a distinct meta-language. In this way we avoid the risk 
of paradox, since keeping the object language apart from the meta-language 
eliminates semantic closure. 
Perhaps, these would be the most obvious reactions against Buridan’s 
“regimentational” approach coming from someone comparing it to the modern 
“formalizational” approach. Nevertheless, these considerations may not be 
sufficient to establish once and for all the “absolute superiority” of the modern 
approach over Buridan’s. For if we take a closer look at the modern practice, we 
can see that it is not much better off concerning these issues. 
It must be conceded at the beginning that the mathematical exactitude of a 
formal logical system is unmatched by any “natural” logic (i.e. a logical system 
based on a certain regimentation of reasoning in some natural language). But the 
exactitude in question concerns only the formal system in and of itself. Concerning 
the formal system, we may have absolutely rigorous proofs of consistency or 
inconsistency, completeness or incompleteness, etc., which we may never 
have concerning an “unfinishable” system of “natural” logic. However, as soon 
as we use a formal logical system to represent and evaluate natural language 
reasoning, the uncertainties and ambiguities of interpretation return with a 
vengeance, as anyone who has ever tried to impart “formalization skills” in a 
symbolic logic class can testify. “Formalization” is the largely intuitive process 
of translating natural language sentences to formulae of a formal language based 
on the linguistic competence of the speakers of the natural language in question 
and their understanding of the import of the symbols of the formal language. 
Therefore, this process involves just as much inexactitude, uncertainty and 
ambiguity as does working with “unregimented” natural language expressions 
in general. 
This difficulty can be overcome by constructing a formal syntax for an 
interesting portion of a natural language, in the vein of the approach of Richard 
Montague and Imre Ruzsa,11 which can then serve as the basis for an exact and 
effective translation procedure into the artificial language of a formal logical 
system. In this way, having a formally constructed (not to say, “regimented”) 
part of a natural language at our disposal, the problem of the inexactitude of 
10  Cf. (Tarski 1944). The gist of the idea of semantic closure is that a language that contains 
its own truth-predicates and has the means of referring to its own sentences is semantically 
closed, which is quite obviously the case with natural languages. According to Tarski, in a 
semantically closed language, Liar-type paradoxes (‘This sentence is false’ – is this true or 
false?) are bound to arise. For a more recent, generalized version of Tarski’s argument, see 
(Priest 1984). 
11  Cf. (Montague 1973), (Montague 1974), (Ruzsa 1989).
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the otherwise merely intuitive formalization process can certainly be avoided. 
However, given that the formal syntax can only cover a sufficiently interesting, 
yet manageable, part of a natural language, this approach brings out most 
clearly the inherently “unfinished” character of the enterprise as far as the 
representation of all possible forms of natural language reasoning is concerned. Thus, 
the formalizational approach can overcome the problems of inexactitude only by 
carving out a manageable part of natural language reasoning, thereby making 
explicit the “unfinished” character of the enterprise. Buridan’s regimentational 
approach, in comparison, simply acknowledges from the start that it can only 
explicate and regulate certain manageable types of natural language reasoning, 
and it does this with the requisite degree of exactitude, yet without introducing 
the explicit, full-fledged formal syntax of an artificial language that would 
allegedly universally reflect the structure of Mentalese underlying all natural 
linguistic structures. 
Since the process of formalization as it is commonly practiced is based on the 
linguistic competence of the speakers of particular natural languages, it involves 
just as much “linguistic provincialism” as does the regimentational approach. 
Actually, it is quite instructive to observe the differences between different 
Montague-style approaches to formalization motivated by different languages, 
especially if they are also motivated by certain logical considerations that are 
“most natural” in those languages. 
But we can also say that the syntax of standard predicate logic as we know 
it was also motivated by some fairly “provincial” linguistic considerations, 
namely, considerations concerning the language of mathematics, rather than any 
actual natural language. This is probably the historical reason for the notorious 
“mismatch” between the syntax of predicate logic on one hand, and the syntax of 
various natural languages on the other, which otherwise agree among themselves 
in those of their syntactic features that predicate logic systematically fails to 
match. Consider again sentences (5)-(8) listed above:
Omnis homo qui est albus currit (5) ↔ (5’) Omnis homo albus currit
Every man who is white runs (6) ↔ (6’) Every white man runs
Omnis homo currit qui est albus (7) ↔ (7’) Omnis homo currit et ille est 
albus
Every man, who is white, runs (8) ↔ (8’) Every man runs, and he is white
In modern predicate logic, these sentences have to be represented in terms of 
the basic vocabulary of the formal language of this logic. In that language, besides 
the logical constants (which Buridan would recognize as syncategorematic terms, 
such as negation, conjunction, conditional, etc.), we have primitive symbols 
referring to individuals, namely, individual names (intuitively corresponding 
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to proper nouns) as well as variables (roughly corresponding to pronouns),12 
and predicates (corresponding to common terms). All complex expressions 
are built up from these primitive symbols by means of an explicit set of rules 
that effectively determine which strings of these symbols are to be regarded 
as well-formed. Frege’s original rationale for this type of construction was that 
he regarded all common terms as functional expressions: on this conception, 
a common term, such as ‘man’, denotes a function from individuals to the 
two truth-values, the True and the False. Thus, the term itself is essentially 
predicative; it needs to be completed with a referring expression picking out an 
individual to yield a complete sentence that denotes one of these truth values. 
Therefore, since for Frege all common terms denote functions of this sort, all 
common terms are essentially predicative. Accordingly, in the sentences above, 
even their grammatical subject terms need to be construed as predicates of 
individuals, which are picked out by variables bound by the quantifier word 
‘every’ or ‘omnis’. It is for this reason that universal sentences in this logic are to 
be represented as universally quantified conditionals. Since the subject terms of 
these sentences are not regarded as having the function of restricting the range 
of individuals to be considered in determining whether the sentence is true, 
these sentences will have to be interpreted as concerning all individuals in the 
universe, stating of them all conditionally that if they fall under the subject, then 
they also fall under the predicate.
Thus, (6) and (8), and the corresponding Latin sentences as well, would on 
this approach be parsed as expressing the same as 
(6’’) For everything (it holds that) if it is a man and it is white, then it is 
running
(8’’) For everything (it holds that) if it is a man, then it is white and it is 
running
In other words, using the variable x in place of the pronoun, 
(6’’’) For every x, if x is a man and x is white, then x is running
(8’’’) For every x, if x is a man, then x is white and x is running
And these, using the symbols of predicate logic, directly yield the matching 
formulae:
(6’’’’) (∀x)[(Mx & Wx) ⊃ Rx]
(8’’’’) (∀x)[Mx ⊃ (Wx & Rx)] 
12  The problems of representing anaphoric pronouns with bound variables of quantifica-
tion theory generated a whole new field of research in the eighties, primarily inspired by 
Peter Geach’s reflections on “donkey-sentences”, coming from medieval logic, and especially 
from Buridan. For a summary account of those developments and their comparison to Buri-
dan’s ideas, see (Klima 1988). 
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However, given Buridan’s radically different conception of the semantic function 
of common terms, he would provide a very different parsing for (6) and (8) (or 
rather for (5) and (7)). For on his conception, common terms have the function 
of signifying several individuals indifferently (as opposed to singular terms that 
would signify one individual as distinct from any other), and correspondingly 
they supposit, i.e., stand for (some of) these individuals in the context of a 
proposition in which the term is actually used for this purpose. Therefore, on 
Buridan’s reading, (6) and (8) (or rather (5) and (7)) do not make a conditional 
claim about all individuals in the universe, but rather a categorical claim about 
a restricted range of individuals, namely, those marked out by the subject term, 
i.e., the supposita of the subject.
In fact, as anyone checking her own linguistic intuitions in English can 
testify, Buridan’s analysis, coming from a “provincial” natural language, namely, 
Latin, matches much better the intuitions of speakers of another “provincial” 
natural language, namely, English. For English speakers would also find it “more 
natural” to understand the corresponding sentences as being categorical claims 
about a restricted range of individuals, rather than conditional claims about 
absolutely everything. To be sure, further reflection on the implications of this sort 
of analysis may further influence one’s judgment on what “the correct” analysis 
of these sentences ought to be, but at least it should be clear that the Fregean 
analysis is definitely not the only possible or even the “most natural” one.
Thus, the Fregean analysis, being only one possible theoretical option, turns 
out to be just as provincial as Buridan’s approach based on a particular natural 
language. Nevertheless, one may still object that at least for the Fregean analysis 
we have a working formal system with all the advantages of mathematical 
exactitude going for it, whereas we have nothing comparable for Buridan’s 
approach. But this is simply not true.
BURIDAN’S LOGIC AS A LOGIC OF RESTRICTED QUANTIFICATION
As I have argued in several earlier papers, a simple, conservative extension of 
predicate logic can go a long way toward capturing in an exact form much of 
medieval logic in general and Buridan’s logic in particular. Once we enhance 
the language of standard predicate logic with restricted variables, and provide 
the appropriate formal interpretation for their semantic evaluation in a formal 
semantic system, the resulting system at once becomes capable of capturing an 
enormous amount of traditional logic, and especially Buridan’s version of it. We 
do not have to go into the technical details of constructing that formal system13 
13  For the technically-minded reader, a semantic system of this sort is available in (Klima 
2001).
2010-4.indd   68 2011.01.21.   13:05:48
GYULA KLIMA: NATURAL LOGIC, MEDIEVAL LOGIC AND FORMAL SEMANTICS 69
to explain its basic intuitive idea and its important philosophical implications 
concerning the relationships between this “enhanced predicate logic”, classical 
predicate logic, and Buridan’s informal logic.
The “basic intuitive idea” can be articulated in the following principles of 
construction:
Restricted variables function as variables in classical predicate logic, i.e., they (1) 
are quantifiable terms that fill in the argument places of predicate letters.
Restricted variables have the general form of ‘v.Av’, where v is what is (2) 
referred to as the operator variable of the restricted variable, and ‘Av’ as the 
matrix of the restricted variable, which is a well-formed formula open in v 
(i.e., having at least one occurrence of v that is not bound by a quantifier). 
The operator variable may itself be a restricted variable, in which case we 
can refer to it as a “nested” restricted variable (a restricted variable “nested” 
in another); other restricted variables occurring in the matrix of a restricted 
variable are spoken of as “embedded” in that restricted variable.
Restricted variables pick their values in a value-assignment (3) not from the 
entire domain of interpretation (“universe of discourse”), but from the 
extension of their matrix, i.e., from the set of individuals of which the matrix 
is true (under a certain value-assignment of variables).
If the extension of the matrix of a restricted variable is empty, then the (4) 
restricted variable has no value (which in the formal system can be represented 
by assigning an arbitrary value to it, outside the domain of interpretation, 
a so-called “zero-entity”, a technical device I owe to Imre Ruzsa). When 
a restricted variable has no value (i.e., technically, its value is outside the 
domain of discourse), then its value cannot fall within the extension of any 
predicate, i.e., all simple affirmative predications containing this variable in 
the argument of a predicate letter will come out as false.
Having these “principles of construction” in place, we can obtain a system 
that (i) reflects more faithfully the syntax and semantics of natural languages 
than standard predicate logic,14 (ii) naturally extends itself to a generalized 
quantification theory, (iii) it not only matches, but surpasses standard predicate 
logic in expressive power, and (iv) provides an analysis of categorical propositions 
perfectly in tune with Aristotelian logic, validating all relations of the traditional 
Square of Opposition and the traditionally valid syllogistic forms.
Let us now take these four points in turn, and see exactly how the system 
constructed in accordance with (1)-(4) can obtain these results.
(i) Predicate logic formulae using unrestricted quantification exhibit a 
compositional structure involving propositional connectives that are nowhere 
14  For a precise characterization of the notion “faithfulness” involved in this intuitive 
claim, see (Klima 1988).
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to be found in the corresponding natural language sentences (be they English, 
Latin or even Hungarian, etc.). If we take a look, e.g., at (6’’’’)-(6) above, the 
structural mismatch is obvious. But the same sort of mismatch becomes even 
more striking if we change the quantifier from universal to particular (or 
“existential”), which requires that the main conditional be replaced with a 
conjunction in the resulting formula, whereas no such change is apparent in the 
syntax of the corresponding natural language sentence. Indeed, the variation 
of the natural language determiner does not require any change at all in the 
rest of the sentence, whereas changing the corresponding quantifier always 
requires a change in the propositional connectives of the formula following it, if 
a corresponding formula can be produced at all. 
Therefore, there is no single propositional connective that could fill the 
place of the question mark in the following semi-formal schemata:
 For every x }
 For some x }
 For the x }    Fx ? Gx
 For most x }
 For five x }
so that we would get correct representations of the following sentence-schemata, 
which obviously exhibit a uniform structure (just as would the corresponding 
Latin, etc.):
  (1) Every  }
  (2) Some   }
  (3) The    }   F(‘s) is/are G(‘s)
  (4) Most   }
  (5) Five   }
Among these schemata, (1) and (2) can be represented in predicate logic 
only with formulae involving different propositional connectives, (3) and (5) 
demand complex formulae to provide their correct truth-conditions (such as the 
Russellian formula: ‘(∃y){[Fy & (∀x)(Fx → x = y)] & Gy}’ for (3)), and for (4) 
there is demonstrably no quantificational formula that would provide its correct 
truth-conditions.15 
(ii) By contrast, in the system of predicate logic enhanced with restricted 
variables (as well as with the requisite set of quantifiers), the following formula 
schema provides an intuitive formalization of (1)-(5): ‘(Qx.Fx)(Gx.)’. This states 
that Q x that is an F is a G, or in the plural form, that Q x’s that are F’s are G’s, 
where Q stands for any of the appropriate determiners or “quantifier words” 
15  For the proof, if “most” is understood as “more than half of the”, see (Barwise and 
Cooper 1981, 214-215.) 
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of English (and mutatis mutandis the same goes for any other natural language). 
This immediately establishes the claim that this system naturally extends itself 
to a generalized quantification theory.16
(iii) People who argue for the superiority of modern predicate logic over 
“traditional”, Aristotelian logic often refer to (various versions of) De Morgan’s 
famous example as proof that the Aristotelian analysis of categorical propositions, 
and correspondingly Aristotelian syllogistic, is incapable of handling reasoning 
involving relational terms. Intuitively, the following looks like a valid inference: 
‘Every man is an animal; therefore, every man’s head is an animal’s head’. 
However, there is no way of parsing this inference along traditional lines so it 
would fit into a valid Aristotelian syllogistic form.
Medieval logicians, taking their cue from Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, treated 
such inferences under the heading de syllogismis ex obliquis, i.e., “on syllogisms 
involving oblique terms”, which is to say, terms in cases other than the nominative 
case, such as the genitive “man’s” in the conclusion of De Morgan’s example.17 
To be sure, “standard syllogistic” treats the terms of a syllogism as unbreakable 
units (just as propositional logic treats atomic sentences as such units), although 
it allows complex terms as substituends of such units. Therefore, when the 
validity of an inference turns on the conceptual connections between parts 
of such complex terms, “standard syllogistic” is indeed inapplicable (just as 
uniform quantification theory, involving only monadic predicates, is unable to 
handle inferences with multiply quantified sentences.) So, to account for such 
inferences, Buridan and others distinguished between the terms of the syllogism 
and the terms of the propositions, where the terms of the syllogism (in particular, the 
middle term) can be parts of the terms of the propositions, and provided further 
syllogistic rules in terms of this distinction, referring to the intrinsic complexity 
of the terms of the propositions involved.
Correspondingly, the predicate logic with restricted variables inspired by 
Buridan provides a compositional semantics for formulae that represent the 
internal structure of propositions with complex terms. Therefore, this logic has 
no more difficulty in handling such inferences than standard predicate logic 
does. There are, however, some important and instructive differences between 
the two.
16  For good surveys of the booming research on generalized quantifiers in the mid-eighties, 
see (Van Benthem and Ter Meulen 1985), and (van Benthem 1986). For a recent survey of 
later developments see (Westerståhl 2005).
17  For Buridan’s treatment, see SD 5. 8.
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In standard predicate logic, the De Morgan-example can be reconstructed 
as follows:
(∀x)(Mx → Ax)
For every x, if x is a man, then x is an animal
________________________________________
(∀x)(∀y)[(Mx & Dxy) → (Ax & Dxy)]18
For every x and every y, if x is a man and y is the head of x, then x is an animal 
and y is the head of x.
Using restricted variables, the same example can be reconstructed in the 
following way:
(∀x Mx)(∃y Ay)(x. = y.)19
Every (x that is a) man is (identical with) some (y that is an) animal
__________________________________________
(∀x.(∃y.My)(Dxy.))(∃u.(∃v.Av)(Duv.))(x. = u.)
Every (x that is a) head of some (y that is a) man is (identical with) a (u that is a) 
head of some (v that is an) animal20
One important difference between these two reconstructions is that if we 
drop the parenthetical phrases in the semi-formal sentences that are simply 
transcribed into the formulae with restricted variables, then we get perfectly 
good English sentences, which cannot be done with the semi-formal sentences 
transcribed into the standard formulae. This quite clearly indicates the close 
match between the syntax of the natural language sentences and the formulae 
with restricted variables.
Another important difference is that while the standard formulae are true 
if there are no men or they have no heads, those with restricted variables in 
those circumstances would be false. Therefore, according to the formalization 
with restricted variables, the inference is not formally valid, unless there is a 
further premise to guarantee that if there are men, then there are men’s heads. 
Actually, this is how it should be. After all, even if it is actually true, it is not 
a logical truth (i.e., a truth based on the meaning of logical connectives) that if 
there are men, then they have heads. Therefore, the formulation with restricted 
variables provides an even better analysis of the natural language sentences, in 
the sense that it better reflects our semantic intuitions as to what is and what is 
not implied by the sentences in question.
18  I am providing here the “stronger”, but “more intuitive” formalization of this sentence. 
Cf. (Merrill 1977).
19  To simplify formulae with restricted variables, the matrix of a restricted variable may be 
omitted after its first occurrence.
20  For a similar analysis with the same results, see (Orenstein 2000). For a detailed dis-
cussion of the neat syntactical match between restricted quantification and natural language 
sentences, see (Klima 1988). 
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Thus, we have to conclude that the “Buridan-inspired” predicate logic with 
restricted variables, besides covering more than standard predicate logic does as 
far as non-standard quantifiers are concerned, can handle what standard predicate 
logic can, indeed, while sticking more faithfully to the syntactic construction 
of natural languages and reflecting better our semantic intuitions concerning 
reasoning in natural languages.
(iv) What accounts for the difference between the judgments of the two different 
formalizations concerning the validity of De Morgan’s example is their difference 
in attributing vs. denying existential import to universal affirmative propositions. 
The reason why De Morgan’s example at first appears to be intuitively valid is 
that we tend to tacitly assume the non-logical truth that if there are men, then 
they have heads too. However, a formally valid inference has to yield truth from 
truth with any terms, which is actually not obvious with De Morgan’s example. 
Consider the following, analogous example: ‘Every man is an animal; therefore, 
every man’s hat is an animal’s hat’. Suppose there are men, but no man has 
a hat, which is certainly possible. In that case it is obviously true that every 
man is an animal, but is it true that every man’s hat is an animal’s hat? Or take 
the following, perhaps even more obvious example: ‘Every horse is an animal; 
therefore, every horse’s wing is an animal’s wing’. Knowing that there are no 
winged horses, and hence no horse’s wings, we would naturally tend to reject the 
conclusion. To be sure, one may still understand this conclusion conditionally, 
as saying that if something is a horse’s wing, then it is an animal’s wing, but 
that conditional reading would lose precisely the matter-of-fact character of the 
original categorical claim.
Indeed, other examples can bolster our intuition that even if universal 
affirmatives may occasionally have the force of a conditional, hypothetical 
claim, especially when they are supposed to express a law-like statement; 
nevertheless, it is simply wrong to assume that they always have to be 
interpreted this way. Consider for example the case of Mary boasting to her 
friends that every boy kissed her at the party yesterday. If her friends later 
find out that there were no boys at the party, then they will certainly take her 
for a liar, rather than accept her claim as being “vacuously” true on account of 
her universal claim expressing a universally quantified conditional with a false 
antecedent. Such and similar examples could be multiplied ad nauseam. What is 
important, though, is the fact that we do have the intuitive distinction between 
the categorical and hypothetical readings of universal affirmatives; therefore, 
a logic that can acknowledge both of these readings is certainly preferable to 
one that can only handle one of them. Since predicate logic with restricted 
variables is a conservative extension of standard predicate logic in the sense 
that all formulae of the standard logic are formulae of the logic enhanced with 
restricted variables, the latter is of course capable of representing whatever the 
former can, but not vice versa.
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CONCLUSION: BURIDAN’S “NATURAL LOGIC” 
VS. ITS RECONSTRUCTION
Nevertheless, although this has to be the end of this lecture, this is far from being 
the end of the story of comparing medieval and modern logic. The foregoing 
could serve merely to illustrate that heeding medieval logicians’ regimentation of 
natural language, we may be able to come up with some more natural formalization 
in a formal language. But, as I argue in detail in my monograph on John Buridan 
(Klima 2009), where this lecture comes from, Buridan would still not be quite 
happy with this formal reconstruction of his logic. And the reason would not be 
its formalism (after all, Buridan also uses some symbolism time and again), but 
rather its restricted applicability in other areas, where Buridan’s logic still has 
important lessons to teach us. In particular, even if quantification theory with 
restricted variables can easily be extended to cover a great deal of Buridan’s 
modal and temporal logic, it cannot quite properly handle Buridan’s treatment 
of intentional contexts generated by words signifying our mental acts. Moreover, 
Buridan would not be quite happy with restricted variables representing his 
common terms, since for him there are simple common terms, say, F, the semantic 
properties of which are different from a complex term, such as ‘an x that is an 
F’. In fact, in various contexts, Buridan would sharply distinguish between the 
logical import of the two. Finally, and even more importantly, Buridan would 
reject both the Quinean idea of ontological commitment usually associated 
with quantification theory and the global distinction between object language 
and meta-language, built into the very construction of this theory. As I argue in 
my book, this double rejection allows Buridan to work out a third alternative 
“between” a Quinean and a Meinongian approach to ontological commitment, as 
well as a viable logical theory for semantically closed natural languages, avoiding 
Liar-type paradoxes. But this much may be just enough by way of “a shameless 
plug” to finish this lecture.
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